Below is the final version of the cover of my book on the creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. The cover image is a photo I took riding a laker through the Welland Canal in 2011.
All posts in category Uncategorized
Posted by danielmacfarlane on November 27, 2013
Post from Active History: http://activehistory.ca/2013/11/a-big-fracking-deal/
Posted by danielmacfarlane on November 13, 2013
During the time spent idling on the North Channel Bridge, waiting to get through the Canadian border crossing at Cornwall, some drivers probably wondered why the bridge is so high. After all, ships don’t use the canal or the channel of the St. Lawrence River which Cornwall fronts. In fact, the high-level bridge was designed to accommodate large vessels in an all-Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway, which never materialized.
This is pertinent because the high-level bridge, with its extensive spans and approaches, is in the process of being replaced by a new, much shorter, low-level crossing (see images below). The federal government is picking up the approximately $75 million dollar tab, which includes demolition of the old bridge and street realignments. The whole project is expected to be completed by 2016, though the new bridge will be opened to traffic before then. This post will highlight some historical aspects of the soon-to-be replaced bridge, drawing from my forthcoming book on the creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project.
Aerial view of North Channel Bridge (looking west) with unused all-Canadian Seaway channel running under to the power dam in the middle distance. Note the elevated span of the bridge to provide full clearance for vessels. The North Channel Bridge spans the St. Lawrence River from the Canadian mainland to Cornwall Island, leading to the South Channel Bridge that connects the island with the U.S. side just east of Massena, New York. Both the north and south spans make up the Seaway International Bridge, which was built in conjunction with the bilateral St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project (1954-59). The whole structure was renamed the Three Nations Crossing in 2000 in reference to the Akwesasne/St. Regis Mohawk community that lives on Cornwall Island and surrounding lands. Due to Mohawk protests, the Canadian customs post was moved from Cornwall Island to the City of Cornwall just a few years ago (and will I assume be moved to accommodate the new bridge).
New low-level bridge under construction beside high-level bridge
At Cornwall the bilateral Moses-Saunders power dam, with the Canadian and American generating stations seamlessly meeting in the middle, created Lake St. Lawrence in conjunction with the Long Sault dam just a few miles to the west and the Iroquois dam much further upstream. To the south of the Moses-Saunders dam (now renamed the Roosevelt-Saunders dam), the 10-mile long Wiley-Dondero ship canal, entirely in American territory, houses the Snell and Eisenhower locks. The area to the west of Cornwall – including the Lost Villages – was inundated by Lake St. Lawrence, the headpond for the power dam. Since just shy of 40,000 acres would end up underneath the water, governments and agencies on both sides of the Canada-U.S. border had to acquire huge amounts of property.
Land acquisition in Cornwall, which was downstream of the power dam and thus not flooded, was mainly connected to transportation infrastructure such as bridge and canals. For example, in 1955 the federal government took 52 acres and approximately 100 properties. In 1957, Canada and the U.S. bought the Cornwall International Bridge Company and replaced the dilapidated existing span with what became the Seaway International Bridge. This also necessitated acquiring – a rather generous term for the methods used – land from the St. Regis First Nation.
Taking a step backwards in terms of chronology, in the early 1950s the Louis St. Laurent government had attempted to secure an all-Canadian Seaway. This would have put all Seaway locks on the north (Canadian) side of the river, including locks at Cornwall. But the all-Canadian Seaway plan was thwarted by the Americans, and the St. Lawrence project ended up as a joint endeavour. Under a 1954 agreement, the locks passing the Moses-Saunders dam were put on the American side. But Canada fought hard to reserve the right to build a future all-Canadian Seaway that would involve locks at Cornwall running north of the power dam. Despite American objections, Canada took several steps during Seaway construction, including a breach in the dike beside the power dam, that could serve as the basis for a future Canadian lock. The channel and the breach in the dike are still readily apparent today.
Map of Cornwall waterfront. This highlights the old Cornwall Canal, all-Canadian Seaway route, Brookdale Avenue, and the North Channel Bridge. By Daniel Macfarlane
View (from south) of Moses-Saunders Power Dam under construction. Area behind the dam is dried out by cofferdams (note infrastructure for potential Canadian seaway lock in dike in upper center of photo). Photo courtesy of Ontario Power Generation.
The new North Channel bridge would have to cross over the prospective all-Canadian route, and thus Canada built the bridge to a height sufficient to accommodate deep-draught vessels. However, this did not prove necessary, as the all-Canadian Seaway was never built, in large part because the Seaway failed to live up to traffic and toll expectations and thus it didn’t make financial sense to build a competing set of locks on the Canadian side.
It may take area residents by surprise to learn that the original plans for the South Channel Bridge, connecting Cornwall Island to the U.S, were quite different from the final placement. Canada and the U.S. were legally obligated to replace the bridge for the New York Central Railroad that was displaced by the Seaway, and it would have to be at a low grade to permit rail traffic. Initial American plans called for a bridge across Polly’s Gut, a narrow and turbulent stretch of the St. Lawrence River between Cornwall Island and the American mainland to the west (rather than the south where the bridge was eventually built). This involved a traffic and rail tunnel that would pass under the Snell lock (because of unstable subsurface conditions, a traffic tunnel was later placed under the Eisenhower lock a bit further to the west). The route was also designed to maximize traffic exposure to the grand new park system that Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY) Chairman Robert Moses – most famous for his remaking of New York City – had planned for Barnhart Island.
That route was a problem, however, as it would mean a much longer trip for the St. Regis (Akwesasne) First Nations. This group had just over 2,000 members, divided between Cornwall-St. Regis-Chenail, an area spreading over Ontario, Quebec, and New York. The Canadian members of this group would have to travel up to 25 miles in a round-about fashion through U.S. territory to access social and industrial services they required at Cornwall. This would negatively affect the community life of the area, as many members attended schools, picked up family allowance and pension cheques, and purchased groceries and supplies in Cornwall. The Canadian federal government was opposed to the Polly’s Gut crossing plan because of the impact on St. Regis, though Ottawa was most concerned about the increased cost of relocating facilities to St. Regis or of transporting them to Cornwall by bus or ferry.
But the New York Central Railroad was convinced to abandon its line from New York to Ottawa in 1956. Without railway grade to worry about, a high-level traffic bridge could be built directly from Cornwall Island to the U.S. mainland just east of Massena instead of over Polly’s Gut. This would be cheaper than the Polly’s Gut alternative, and cut the travel distance for the St. Regis band members by more than half. But it did lead to cost overruns for PASNY because of the planning and preparation that had already gone into the initial Polly’s Gut bridge scheme. And it infuriated Moses, who launched into his trademark tirades and scathing letters.
Aerial view (looking west) of construction on Moses-Saunders Power Dam (center) and Wiley-Dondero Canal (along the left side). Note the western end of Cornwall in the bottom right corner. Much of the area upstream of the dam would eventually be inundated.
Industrialization of the St. Lawrence in the 1950s transformed the landscape/waterscape, transportation infrastructure, and the urban-river relationships at Cornwall. The city’s traffic patterns were spatially reorganized. The No. 2 Highway, which had been the main auto route between Montreal and Toronto, needed to be relocated since it would be mostly under water. The No. 2 was rebuilt near the shoreline as a local highway, while a freeway (Highway 401) was eventually built north of the community. Brookdale Avenue became the central axis and connection from the bridge to the new freeway, shifting the commercial center of Cornwall away from downtown. The old canal along the city’s waterfront, and much of the related industry, was abandoned. In many ways, the community was cut off – physically and symbolically – from the river. Yet it is too simplistic too portray the St. Lawrence as merely a defeated river; rather, it is an adapted envirotechnical system characterized by different relationships between environment and technology, artificial and natural, and city and river. Nonetheless, the environmental repercussions for the St. Lawrence were enormous, both in the short and long run.
Just as the Seaway International Bridge changed the area, the soon-to-be-completed bridge could well forge new patterns and relationships. The low-level bridge will have a range of ripple effects on transportation routes in and around Cornwall. For example, vehicles will leave the bridge much closer to the waterfront and downtown business and tourist area. Resituating the bridge will hopefully help improve the awkwardly-placed border station.
View of Cornwall (looking east) from the North Channel Bridge
Granted, waiting on the bridge to clear customs provided a bird’s eye view of Cornwall to the east (see picture above), and brownfields from industrial abandonment to the west – though I’m told that would have been a much less pleasant experience back when the mills spewed noxious pollutants out of their smokestacks at virtually the same level as the waiting vehicles. The toxins fumes likely shortened the lifespan of the bridge, as well as local residents, and contributed to its aesthetic deterioration. The dramatic appeal and elevated view of the North Channel Bridge will be lost, but the designs for the new bridge look promising. At the very least, it will be less imposing on the skyline, will have a much smaller footprint, and be less of a physical divider. The construction of the new bridge and the removal of the old span will hopefully reinvigorate recreational and cultural uses of the waterfront area. Foot and bike movement across the river will be improved – crossing wasn’t always a pleasant experience on the elevated North Channel Bridge, to which anyone who has walked across its precarious sidewalk on a cold or windy day can attest!
Posted by danielmacfarlane on October 29, 2013
I submitted 3 photos to this contest (see below) and managed to come out with second place! http://niche-canada.org/node/10739
Posted by danielmacfarlane on October 3, 2013
I have an article on Niagara Falls in the October volume of Environmental History. Here is a link to the article and an abstract: http://envhis.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/4/759.abstract
Over the first half of the twentieth century, Canada and the United States considered engineering works that would simultaneously divert water around Niagara Falls for hydroelectric production while ostensibly maintaining and enhancing the appearance of the great cataract. Binational studies and environmental diplomacy resulted in the 1950 Niagara Diversion Treaty, which authorized the International Niagara Control Works. The construction of these remedial works in the 1950s physically reconfigured Niagara Falls and the Niagara River immediately above the falls in order to divert water while masking the scenic effect of lower flow volumes. As a result, depending on the time of day, up to three-quarters of the Niagara River’s water does not go over the falls but is sent via massive tunnels to hydroelectric generating stations downstream. During debates in the following decades about further remedial works, public opinion helped stop some modifications of Niagara Falls, signifying a shift in attitudes. Using multiple archives from both countries, including the International Joint Commission, this study uncovers the conceptual and physical engineering of the Niagara landscape and waterscape in the middle decades of the twentieth century. The modern history of the manipulation of Niagara Falls highlights both shared and differing Canadian and American conceptions of the links between border waters, progress, technology, and nationalism.
Posted by danielmacfarlane on September 27, 2013
This semester I’m teaching a kind of unique Canadian Studies seminar on Canadian Cultural Landscapes. It combines a variety of disciplines, and it has been taught a variety of ways in the past. I definitely borrowed from others who have taught this course, or something similar, at Carleton University and Dalhousie University. I gave it an environmental history feel, but have incorporated cultural geography, planning, architecture, cultural studies, etc., and altered it to reflect my areas of interest. I likely don’t have time to make further changes to the syllabus for this semester (as I’m posting this two days before the first class) , but I’d be interested in feedback in case I teach it again (or if anyone notices the dreaded typo, let me know asap). Additionally, I’m thinking that by posting it online it will be more readily available as a resource in case someone else is teaching a similar course in the future (maybe I’m alone, but whenever I design a new or new-to-me course, I start by looking online for other syllabi on the topic).
Canadian Studies 4400
Canadian Cultural Landscapes
Dr. Daniel Macfarlane
Class Location: 1216 Dunton
Class Hours: 11:35-2:25
Office Location: 1220 Dunton
Office Hours: 2:30-3:30 and by appointment
Contact Information: firstname.lastname@example.org 613-883-7991
COURSE DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES
This course examines Canadian cultural landscapes and the development of Canadian individual and collective cultural identities through the interdisciplinary lenses of history, heritage, environment, geography, architecture, planning, visual sources, and literature. We will debate the very definition of a “cultural landscape.” We will consider cultural landscapes as a tool for understanding physical and mental landscapes and their shaping of identity, all at different scales. We will intellectually tour across Canada from east to west, north to south, past and present, examining geographically and culturally diverse landscapes. We will take advantage of our setting in the nation’s capital and pay particular attention to cultural landscapes in the National Capital Region.
Participation (25%): Your frequency in attending in this course, and the quality of your participation, will determine your participation mark.
Ottawa Landscape Assessment (15%): Compare, critique, and assess two of the NCC reports on Ottawa landscapes. The reports and further instructions will be provided by the instructor. The length of this assignment is 6-8 pages. Students will also give a brief (i.e., 3-5 minutes) presentation in class.
Landscape Critique Proposal (10%): For this assignment, students will be asked to write a brief research proposal outlining their final course project: a landscape critique (see below). In this proposal, a student will select a Canadian cultural landscape to study and 1) describe its physical and formal characteristics; 2) explain its general economic, political, cultural and/or social significance; 3) address the sources, readings, and methodologies that will be employed. The length of this assignment is 3-5 pages. Due November 6.
Presentation of Initial Research Findings (10%): In the final weeks of the course, students will be given the opportunity to present their in-progress landscape critique to the rest of the class. This presentation will have the characteristics of a research workshop in which the student outlines their research project in a 15 minute presentation. The rest of the class will then provide constructive criticism and suggestions that will help the student to strengthen their final paper. In other words, this is not intended to be a presentation of finished research but of a work in progress. Due last few weeks of class.
Landscape critique (40%): This paper contains the results of the research that the student has conducted throughout on their chosen Canadian cultural landscape, its history, its “official” social, cultural, and political significance and the manner in which different groups have sought to assign different meanings and uses to that landscape. The length of this paper is between 15-20 pages. However, students do have the options of utilizing a “report” method (i.e., NCC landscape reports) rather than a traditional paper format. Students can also, in consultation with the instructor, supplement or replace their papers with digital approaches: films, photographic essays, websites, GIS maps, etc. Due December 13.
*Late work will be penalized at a rate of 5% per day. You must submit all assignments to get a grade for the course – failure to complete all components can result in an incomplete mark. The format for all formal written assignments will be 12 point Times New Roman font, double-spaced, 1 inch margins. Use footnotes rather than endnotes, though you have your choice of Chicago or MLA style for referencing.
The University Senate defines plagiarism as “presenting, whether intentionally or not, the ideas, expression of ideas or work of others as one’s own.” This can include:
- reproducing or paraphrasing portions of someone else’s published or unpublished material, regardless of the source, and presenting these as one’s own without proper citation or reference to the original source;
- submitting a take-home examination, essay, laboratory report or other assignment written, in whole or in part, by someone else;
- using ideas or direct, verbatim quotations, or paraphrased material, concepts, or ideas without appropriate acknowledgment in any academic assignment;
- using another’s data or research findings;
- failing to acknowledge sources through the use of proper citations when using another’s works and/or failing to use quotation marks;
- handing in “substantially the same piece of work for academic credit more than once without prior written permission of the course instructor in which the submission occurs.”
Plagiarism is a serious offence which cannot be resolved directly with the course’s instructor. The Associate Dean of the Faculty conducts a rigorous investigation, including an interview with the student, when an instructor suspects a piece of work has been plagiarized. Penalties are not trivial. They can include a final grade of “F” for the course.
You may need special arrangements to meet your academic obligations during the term because of disability, pregnancy or religious obligations. Please review the course outline promptly and write to me with any requests for academic accommodation during the first two weeks of class, or as soon as possible after the need for accommodation is known to exist.
Students with disabilities requiring academic accommodations in this course must register with the Paul Menton Centre for Students with Disabilities (PMC) for a formal evaluation of disability-related needs. Documented disabilities could include but are not limited to mobility/physical impairments, specific Learning Disabilities (LD), psychiatric/psychological disabilities, sensory disabilities, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and chronic medical conditions. Registered PMC students are required to contact the PMC, 613-520-6608, every term to ensure that your Instructor receives your Letter of Accommodation, no later than two weeks before the first assignment is due or the first in-class test/midterm requiring accommodations. If you only require accommodations for your formally scheduled exam(s) in this course, please submit your request for accommodations to PMC by Nov. 8, 2013 for the Fall term and March 7, 2014 for the Winter term.
You can visit the Equity Services website to view the policies and to obtain more detailed information on academic accommodation at http://carleton.ca/equity/accommodation.
All of the readings are available online, in the Carleton library, or from the instructor. You are not required to purchase any books or readings, though you may want to photocopy some of the items that will be put on reserve in the Carleton library (see below). You may also want to purchase copies of certain books (which are not expensive, particularly used copies) that the entire class is required to read since “someone already checked out the library’s copy” is not going to suffice as an excuse (e.g., Jenkins, Passfield).
The following readings are on reserve in the Carleton library. Readings that are not available digitally or online are also marked by an asterisk (*) throughout the course schedule:
-Pamela Stern and Lisa Stevenson, eds., Critical Inuit Studies: An Anthology of Contemporary Arctic Ethnography, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006)
-Stéphane Castonguay and Michèle Dagenais, eds, Metropolitan Natures: Environmental Histories of Montreal (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011)
-Irene Gammel, ed., Making Avonlea: L.M. Montgomery and Popular Culture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002)
-L.M. Montgomery, Jane of Lantern Hill (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1937)
-I.S. MacLaren, ed., Culturing Wilderness in Jasper National Park (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2007)
-H. Epp, ed., Three Hundred Prairie Years (Regina, SK: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1993)
-Phil Jenkins, An Acre of Time: The Enduring Value of Place (New York: Macfarlane, Walter, and Ross, 1996)
September 11: Introduction
September 18: What is a Cultural Landscape?
-Graeme Wynn foreword from William Turkel, The Archive of Place: Unearthing the Pasts of the Chilcotin Plateau (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2007): ix-xviii (available online in the Carleton library)
-Brian Osborne, “Landscapes, Memory, Monuments and Commemoration: putting identity in its place,” in Canadian Ethnic Studies, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3 (2002): 39-77
-Don Mitchell “Cultural landscapes: just landscapes or landscapes of justice?” Progress in Human Geography 27 (6) (December 2003): 787-96
-Definition and Assessment of Cultural Landscapes of Heritage Value on NCC Lands: http://www.canadascapital.gc.ca/property-management/what-we-manage/cultural-landscapes-canadas-capital-region)
-UNESCO definition: http://whc.unesco.org/en/culturallandscape/#1
-Canada’s Cultural Landscapes:
-Laurentian thesis, Staples thesis, Metropolitan-Hinterland thesis – Canadian Encyclopedia Online: http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com
September 25: Indigenous Cultural Landscapes
-An Approach to Aboriginal Cultural Landscapes (Parks Canada): http://www.pc.gc.ca/docs/r/pca-acl/index_e.asp
-*Beatrice Collignon, “Inuit Place Names and Sense of Place,” in Pamela Stern and Lisa Stevenson, eds., Critical Inuit Studies: An Anthology of Contemporary Arctic Ethnography (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006): 187-205
-Jon Johnson, “The Indigenous Environmental History of Toronto, ‘The Meeting Place’” in Colin Coates et al., eds., Urban Explorations: Environmental Histories of the Toronto Region (Hamilton, ON: L.R. Wilson Institute for Canadian Studies-McMaster University, 2013): 58-69 (available from instructor as a pdf)
-Caroline Desbiens, “Producing North and South: A Political Geography of Hydro Development in Quebec,” Canadian Geographer 48, no. 2 (2004): 101–18
October 2 – Quebec landscapes
-John Crowley, “Taken on the Spot: the Visual Appropriation of New France for the British Cultural Landscape,” The Canadian Historical Review 86, 1 (March 2005): 1-28
-Colin Coates, “Like ‘the Thames towards Putney’: The Appropriation of Landscape in Lower Canada,” Canadian Historical Review Vol LXXIV, no. 3 (September, 1993): 317-343
-Colin Coates, “The Colonial Landscapes of the Early Town,” in Stéphane Castonguay and Michèle Dagenais, eds., Metropolitan Natures: Environmental Histories of Montreal (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011)
-Luc Noppen and Lucie K. Morisset, “The Architecture of Old Quebec, or the history of a
palimpsest,” Material History Review 1999 (50): 11-25 (available online through the Carleton library, but not available for download)
October 9 – The Capital (Ottawa Landscape Assignment due)
-*Robert Passfield, Building the Rideau Canal: A Pictorial History (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 2004) (note that this for Library use only)
-David Gordon and Brian S. Osborne, “Constructing National Identity in Canada’s Capital, 1900-2000: Confederation Square and the National War Memorial,” Journal of
-brief presentations on each student’s Ottawa Landscape Assignment
October 16: Ottawa field trip
-*Phil Jenkins, An Acre of Time: The Enduring Value of Place (New York: Macfarlane, Walter, and Ross, 1996)
-Carleton History Department app and website on Rideau Canal: http://ccph.carleton.ca/
-Virtual Museum tours of downtown Ottawa landscapes: http://passageshistoriques-heritagepassages.ca/ang-eng/origines-origins/introduction
-Center for Culture / History / Environment, Reading the Urban Landscape: http://envhist.wisc.edu/cool_stuff/landscapetips.shtml
October 23: Great Lakes landscapes
-EHTV episode on Niagara Falls: http://niche-canada.org/node/10124
-Daniel Macfarlane, “Creating a Cataract: The Transnational Manipulation of Niagara Falls to the 1950s,” in Colin Coates et al., eds., Urban Explorations: Environmental Histories of the Toronto Region (Hamilton, ON: L.R. Wilson Institute for Canadian Studies-McMaster University, 2013) (available from instructor as a pdf)
-Claire Campbell, “Toronto, Old Ontario, and the Near North: Landscapes of the Group of Seven,” in Colin Coates et al., eds., Urban Explorations: Environmental Histories of the Toronto Region (Hamilton, ON: L.R. Wilson Institute for Canadian Studies-McMaster University, 2013) (available from instructor as a pdf)
-Daniel Macfarlane, Fluid Border: The Canada-U.S. Creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project (Vancouver: UBC Press, forthcoming), Introduction, chapters 4-6, and Conclusion (available from instructor)
October 30: No Class (break)
November 6: East Coast landscapes (Landscape Critique Proposal due)
-*James de Jonge, “Through the Eyes of Memory: L.M. Montgomery’s Cavendish,” in Irene Gammel, ed., Making Avonlea: L.M. Montgomery and Popular Culture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002): 252-267
-*L.M. Montgomery, Jane of Lantern Hill (McClelland & Stewart, 1937): chapters 13-17 and 34
-Jennifer Nelson, “The Space of Africville: Creating, Regulating and Remembering the Urban ‘Slum’,” Canadian Journal of Law and Society/Revue canadienne de droit et société vol. 15, no. 2 (2000): 163-185
-P. Ennals and D. Holdsworth, “Vernacular Architecture and the Culture Landscape of the Maritime Provinces: A Reconnaissance,” Acadiensis 10 (1981): 86-105
November 13: Western Canada landscapes
-Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, Wilderness and Waterpower: How Banff National Park Became a Hydroelectric Storage Reservoir (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2013): Introduction, chapters 6, 8, 10, Conclusion (available to download at: http://uofcpress.com/books/9781552386347)
-Brian K. Ray et al, “The Changing ‘face’ of the Suburbs: Issues of Ethnicity and Residential Change in Suburban Vancouver,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 21(1) (1997): 75-99
-Sean Kheraj, “Restoring Nature: Ecology, Memory, and the Storm History of Vancouver’s Stanley Park,” Canadian Historical Review 88, 4 (2007): 577-612
November 20: Prairie landscapes & Presentations
-*Randy Widdis, “Saskatchewan: The Present Cultural Landscape,” in H. Epp, ed., Three Hundred Prairie Years (Regina, SK: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1993)
-Joan M. Schwartz, “More than ‘Competent description of an intractably empty landscape’: A strategy for critical engagement with historical photographs,” Historical Geography 31 (2003): 105-130
-R.D. Francis, “The Ideal and the Real; The Image of the Canadian West in the Settlement Period,” in Richard R.C. Davis and R. Ruggles, eds., Rupert’s Land: A Cultural Tapestry (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1988) (available online or in print in Carleton library)
November 27: Presentations
December 4: Presentations (last day of class)
Posted by danielmacfarlane on September 9, 2013
Probably few people have heard of the Gut Dam. It had a very minor supporting role in my doctoral dissertation on the history of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power project, and is mostly reduced to footnotes peppered throughout my forthcoming book (I just finished the final copyedit and the book is slated for release around February 2014) on the same topic. So I decided that a quick synopsis of the Gut Dam story might make a nice little blog post.
Canada installed the Gut Dam in the St. Lawrence River in the first decade of the twentieth century, with U.S. consent. It was placed between Galop and Adams Islands, just downstream from Prescott, Ontario and Ogdensburg, New York (see images). The main purpose of the dam was to eliminate a cross-current that interfered with vessel transit in the nearby Galop Rapids, as well as raise the water level in the upper entrance of the Galop Canal. The dam was a low barrier consisting of a stone-filled timber crib about 30 feet in width resting on the river bottom, topped with about two feet of concrete. A mixture of stone and clay was placed along the upstream side of the crib and a rock fill on the downstream side.
The Gut Dam raised little controversy for the first half century of its existence. But in the early 1950, in the lead-up to the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project (built between 1954 and 1959 by Canada and the U.S.) engineers had to establish a “river profile” and develop a “method of regulation” for the river and Lake Ontario. A “river profile” meant the side schematic view of a river’s course from start to finish – the damming of the St. Lawrence changed the profile from a series of incremental slopes to just a few large drops, more akin to stairs. The “method of regulation” referred to the levels between which the water would be maintained by dams and control works in order to meet prescribed goals (e.g., hydroelectric production).
I’ve discussed the engineering and regulating of the St. Lawrence in other blog posts, and do so in great detail in the upcoming book. Suffice it to say here that the overarching aim was to maintain the water levels at an average that equated to “natural levels” but also to improve on nature by removing the extremes of high and low flows in order to create a predictable and orderly river. “Natural” was defined as that which had existed in the nineteenth century before the first man-made alterations to water levels – that is, before the Gut Dam was installed.
Yet, establishing exactly what constituted a “state of nature” was problematic from the outset for a number of reasons, including the fact that Canada and the U.S. disagreed on the historic impact of the Gut Dam on water levels. The chairman of the U.S. section of the International Joint Commission, which oversaw the engineering of the river, nonetheless stated that the St. Lawrence project would be approved “over his dead body” if the Gut Dam was not removed first, since shoreowners on the U.S. side of Lake Ontario blamed the dam for high water levels that damaged their property.
It was clear that the Canadian government would need to consent to the removal of the Gut Dam in order for the dual St. Lawrence project to proceed. Thus Canada agreed to the dam’s removal, provided it would not prejudice navigation, power, and other interests downstream. Work to eliminate the dam began in October 1952, and in January 1953, the Canadian Minister of Transport announced that the removal of the Gut Dam had been completed.
However, studies in the 1950s showed that Gut Dam’s impact on water levels in the river and lake had been exaggerated – it was really about four and a half inches, which was approximately half of what had been alleged by its critics. Nonetheless, a number of claims were subsequently made by U.S. Lake Ontario shore owners because of Gut Dam. They unsuccessfully tried to sue Canada, and requested that the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission examine the claims. Finally, in 1968, Canada agreed to pay a token $350,000 as settlement for the alleged damage.
Aside from illuminating a historical tidbit that might only be of interest to those from the area, or those interested in dams and hydraulic engineering history, what do we learn from Gut Dam? The saga sheds a bit of light on the hybridity of certain riverine environments, evolving expert comprehension of Great Lakes water levels, and how science and engineering can be politicized. Finally, Gut Dam shows how all these issues flow into bigger issues (i.e., St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project) in the history of North American transborder environmental/water relations.
 International Joint Commission, Canadian Section, docket 67-2-5:6, Lake Ontario Levels Reference, Meetings, McNaughton, Burbridge, Cote 1953/01/16, Memorandum to General McNaughton re: August 29, 1952, meeting, September 2, 1952. Carl F. Goodman, “Canada-United States Settlement of Gut Dam Claims: Report of the Agent of the United States before the Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal,” International Legal Materials 8, 1 (January 1969): 118-43.
Posted by danielmacfarlane on August 25, 2013
I have a forthcoming article in the October volume of the journal Environmental History, titled “A Completely Man-Made and Artificial Cataract”: The Transnational Manipulation of Niagara Falls.” Advance access is now available:
Posted by danielmacfarlane on June 29, 2013
The International Joint Commission (IJC) has recently announced public hearings for July on its proposed new method of regulation for water levels on the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario. This new method has been called Bv7 for a while, but is now titled Plan 2014 (which is essentially Bv7 with modifications): http://ijc.org/en_/losl/home. In my forthcoming book (UBC Press, early 2014) on the history of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, I discuss at length how the initial methods of regulation came about, as this might give both the public and policymakers pause when it comes to further attempts to control water systems. While Plan 2014 is an important improvement, any methods of regulating the St. Lawrence, and the ideas and approaches such river profiles are built upon, are deeply flawed. The following is excerpted from the the draft book manuscript:
“AS NEARLY AS MAY BE”
The shape of the new river/reservoir was determined by a small coterie of experts from both Canada and the United States. This process was largely taken for granted, both by the public and by the governments involved, and the final result made it all appear a foregone conclusion. But beneath the surface, establishing the water levels was an uncertain and imprecise process, determined as much by personal and political motivations as it was by scientific expertise. Charting the evolution of the high-level engineering of the St. Lawrence waters, which is the focus of this section, shows the experts and planners to be products of their cultural and professional context, and reveals some of the contradictions in their logic of progress.
In addition to political and economic issues that had the potential to hold up construction, actual work on the interdependent St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project had been unable to progress until the engineers had established a “river profile” and developed a “method of regulation” for the river and Lake Ontario. The “method of regulation” referred to the levels between which the water would be maintained by dams and control works in order to meet prescribed goals (e.g. hydro-electric production). The explicit goal was to maintain the water levels at an average that equated to “natural levels” but also to improve on nature by removing the extremes of high and low and flows in order to create a predictable and orderly river. “Natural” was defined as that which had existed in the 19th century before the first manmade alterations to water levels. For the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario, the natural levels were what existed before Canada installed the Gut dam in the St. Lawrence River between Galops and Adams islands in the early 20th century.[i]
Yet establishing exactly what constituted a “state of nature” was problematic from the outset. Not only did representatives of the two countries disagree upon the historic impact of the Gut dam, but it was also difficult to find information regarding the natural levels to use as a baseline. The Joint Board of Engineers had set the elevation of 248.1 (feet above sea level) as the high water level in 1926, but there was concern that this measurement was unreliable because of the geological phenomenon of earth tilt, as well as a 1944 earthquake centered between Cornwall and Massena. Indeed, engineering studies indicated that natural factors must have played a much larger role in the recent rise in Lake Ontario water levels than had the man-made factors (i.e. diversions into the Great Lakes basin), though this assessment may have been partially motivated by the desire to escape liability for the damage done to the property of lakeshore property owners.
Nonetheless, 248 feet was taken as the extreme elevation since a minimum and maximum range of levels needed to be determined. The various governmental and construction entities had to know the final expected levels before proceeding with digging channels and locks. Starting construction before the water levels had been determined risked costly mistakes, e.g. the dredging costs for the power entities would rise several million dollars for each foot the water levels were lowered.[ii] The International Joint Commission’s 1952 order of approval had also provided that any concerned interests (e.g. shore-front property) would be given adequate legal protection and indemnity in their respective country. Largely in response to the complaints of the Lake Ontario Land Owners and Beach Protection Association, which represented shore owners, the Lake Ontario levels issue was given its own International Joint Commission (IJC) docket in addition to the St. Lawrence project. The Lake Ontario Joint Board of Engineers was formed in 1953, and the Lake Ontario issue became intertwined with the St. Lawrence discussions, as any decision about levels on the river would affect the lake. The corollary of restricting Lake Ontario water levels was the various downstream impacts; for example, lowering water levels by a foot meant the annual loss of 225,000,000 kilowatt hours of power development at the Barnhart dam. [Figure 6.2 approx]
As the binational negotiations for a joint vs. solely Canadian seaway reached their zenith in 1954, the International Joint Commission engineers were busy utilizing models to simulate historical water levels on the St. Lawrence River and Lake Ontario. It became apparent that there had been errors in the calculation of Method of Regulation No. 5, which was serving as the interim measure, as it would barely lower the maximum levels on Lake Ontario.[iii] R.A.C. Henry, one of the Canadian experts on the engineering aspects of the St. Lawrence, commented on the process whereby the engineering representatives of the two countries had arrived at the previous “238-242” range of levels for Barnhart dam: “In light of the evidence which is available on the subject it appears reasonably certain that the 238-242 range was actually a compromise between two conflicting views and was not based upon any positive and well-defined line of reasoning … .”[iv] Yet Henry and his colleagues were not immune from similar errors. Between 1954 and 1959 there were many engineering miscalculations, assumptions, compromises, and partisan preferences. Shortly after Henry’s observation, in an internal Canadian meeting, HEPCO General Manager Otto Holden stated outright that they did not know what the natural conditions were. General McNaughton, who reputedly dominated the IJC and was known as a tough Canadian nationalist, emphasized “that the balance of conditions on Lake Ontario is so delicate that he could not feel assurance that the engineers could in fact keep the levels within the 244-248 range.”[v] As a result, they strove to attain levels “as nearly as may be.” However, in public they gave an impression of preciseness and confidence.
To be fair, the planners were in many ways products of their training and societal ideals, and were subject to dominant national and transnational ideas that promoted the collaboration of industrial capital and the state as necessary to maximize the development of natural resources in the name of economic and social progress. They believed they were wisely maximizing natural resources. There was great societal and occupational pressure on the “experts” to provide answers and do so in a confident manner: in addition to hundreds of millions of dollars, many jobs and related economic factors, national and organizational pride, and the role of technology and expertise in capitalist/democratic and communist Cold War tensions, their personal and professional stature was at stake. Whereas scientists studying pollution issues in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin a decade later could publicly admit to uncertainty, open disclosure of doubt was unthinkable for the St. Lawrence engineers.[vi] [Insert Figures 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 approx – ideally keep together]
All plans and specifications had to be approved by the St. Lawrence Joint Board of Engineers, but problems soon appeared because the power entities and construction agencies failed to submit their plans, and the Board of Engineers also became embroiled in the Cornwall channels dredging controversy. The Canadian and American sections of the International Lake Ontario Board of Engineers disagreed about the maximum level of Lake Ontario, squabbling over fractions of an inch. The Americans seemed to be largely motivated by political concerns stemming from the protests of Lake Ontario beach owners, while the Canadian position was largely predicated on protecting Montreal interests, for any lowering of Lake Ontario levels would tend to raise water levels in the western Quebec section of the St. Lawrence.[vii] The main future users of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project – power production, navigation, shoreline property, and downstream interests – wanted different minimum and maximum water levels or varying ranges of stages (i.e. difference between high and low levels) and pleasing everyone seemed impossible. At the various public hearings that were conducted on the lake levels, many people came to voice their concern about the impact of higher water levels, such as shoreline erosion. However, the transcripts show that property owners were worried about their own property value, rather than nature or ecological impact.
Regardless, in March 1955 the International Joint Commission told the Canadian and American governments that it was possible to regulate the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario in such a way as to balance the various demands. A revised method of regulation was arrived at, labeled 12-A-9, but there were problems with that as well: for example, tests showed that under its parameters the seaway would constrict the channel at Montreal. There was discussion about increasing the upper limit marginally from 248.0 to, for example, 248.3, but such precise goals appear, in retrospect, somewhat strange given the uncertainty about the evidence and tests they used – engineers were trying to ascertain the historic conditions on which they based their arguments at the same time they were making their arguments. The guiding principle of “as nearly as may be” continued to prevail. In July 1956 the IJC issued a supplementary order directing that Lake Ontario levels be maintained between 244 and 248, again adding the “nearly as may be” rider. Yet soon after, method 12-A-9 was replaced by another method, 1958-A. The precise technical differences between these methods are not important here – rather, it is the frequency of changes and the decision-making manner that are noteworthy because they betray how messy and reactive the process of regulating the river levels actually was.
Attention also frequently turned to the ability of control works, such as the Iroquois dam, to manage water flows in such a way so as to manipulate winter ice formation and prevent blockages. Here too the propensity of the engineers to act as if they could master their subject despite the imprecision of their knowledge (and their awareness of this impreciseness) was apparent. Intriguing was the way in which they labeled anything beyond their control or understanding as an “Act of God,”[viii] suggesting that if it was unknowable by their scientific techniques, it was beyond comprehension. It was not so much the case that the governments and planners involved could not comprehend the complexity of their task, but rather that they chose to ignore or mentally exclude the uncontrollable aspects of the St. Lawrence environment in order to persist in their belief that they had perfect conceptual understanding. Put another way, they effectively bracketed those factors and contingencies for which they could not account or control.
Part of the problem stemmed from the faith that the engineers placed in their models. The planning authorities, including the IJC, were enamored with these models and believed them to be indispensable for determining the future fluvial geomorphology; thus they were central to the engineering recommendations. Models were, however, often found to be wrong. Sometimes this stemmed from incorrect knowledge, such as faulty gauge data, about the river on which they were based.[ix] Because of the scale of the models, a slight error would be distorted out of proportion when applied to actual excavations or structures in the river. Such distortions also obtained in attempts to simulate the turbidity of the river by increasing the model roughness factor.[x] In a further example, which exposes the rivalries that also affected the various national sections of the different engineering boards, as well as the problem created by all the spoil from excavation, HEPCO complained that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers model of the American seaway installations in the International Rapids section (IRS) did not “sufficiently exploit the river and the terrain and that the disposal areas have been unwisely shown. In at least one case, disposal could prove a hazard to navigation. … had simply decided somewhat crudely, to bulldoze their way in a straight line through the area regardless of its natural features.”[xi]
Even after years of experience with the St. Lawrence models, significant problems were still occurring in early 1958: “[t]he model, although not near final verification, already showed inconsistencies in the prototype data” and as a result “it was again necessary to suspend continuous operation of the model due to incomplete, indefinite and unconfirmed prototype data.”[xii] Indicating the impact of improper extrapolation from models to actual river conditions, in March “it was discovered that, due to an oversight in establishing … conditions, an area comprising approximately 1½ blocks was left in the lower channel.”[xiii] Such incidents show that the planners and engineers were quite flexible and adaptive when they encountered changed conditions or errors, but also indicate the flaws in the conceptual approaches employed by the hydraulic engineers.
St. Lawrence planners had spent decades studying and analyzing the river conditions and were attuned to many of the local conditions. While abstracting sections of the river into macro-scale models, the planners and builders of the St. Lawrence project relied on extensive studies of the specific conditions at particular spots in the St. Lawrence.[xiv] All told, 475 engineers collectively worked on the project, and many themselves explored the river and its environs in great detail, relying heavily on specific place information produced by water gauges, soil and rock samples, soundings, test drills, and elevation measurements.[xv] However, this knowledge, generated by “experts” and their technologies and methodologies, was the only useful and acceptable type of knowledge; local and therefore “unscientific” knowledge was ignored, for the planners were after a specific type of information. They had no interest in the embodied, experiential knowledge of those who knew the river valley first-hand.[xvi] Given the size of the area that was affected, the St. Lawrence engineers were unable to know in detail every square foot of river, and in a number of cases the sub-surface conditions encountered took them by surprise. Nonetheless, the engineers believed that when they had sufficient knowledge of conditions on the ground – the types of rock, the composition of soils, the water flows and velocities – they could control the entire river and ecosystem.
Despite construction and engineering problems, strikes, supply issues, legal and political delays that threatened the target date for the raising of the power pool on July 1, 1958, the St. Lawrence River Joint Board of Engineers felt confident enough to authorize that it proceed. The filling proceeded very closely with the anticipated schedule, reaching the prescribed forebay level of 236 feet early in the morning of July 4 – it reached 238 a few days later, and then 240.5 in December 1959.[xvii] An elaborate gauging system tracked water levels and flows. Method 1958-A remained as the provisional working model, although engineers were clear that it would likely need to be adjusted, and it was superseded by 1958-C at the beginning of 1962, which in turn was replaced the following October by Method 1958-D, though it is scheduled to be replaced.[xviii] During the first year after the power pool had been raised, there were problems with ice forming “hanging dams” that reduced power output, and issues with low water levels downriver from the Barnhart dam in the early 1960s. [xix] It also quickly became apparent that the water level (and thus the power head) was higher on the American side of the Moses-Saunders dam than on the Canadian, and as a result the power entities agreed to equally share the output of power, rather than inflow of water.[xx]
The Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY) and the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario (HEPCO) concluded an operating agreement for the power works, and meetings between the two entities continued well into the 1960s to sort out the division of expenses and take care of remaining aspects of the project. Legal difficulties concerning redress continued, as it seemed that the legal structures in Canada provided no means of compensating those injured by changing water levels. Concerns about liability also led to debates about whether the International Joint Commission (through the St. Lawrence Board of Control) or the power entities would have responsibility for controlling the gates at Iroquois dam. The Board of Control was eventually given responsibility for establishing the water levels. But the method of regulation was not always satisfactory, as there were significant problems with low water levels in the river in the 1960s, and then high water levels in the 1970s.[xxi] These were attributed to natural supplies of greater variance than had occurred in the 100-year period upon which the engineers had based the various methods of regulation.[xxii] Nevertheless, in the longer term, compared to pre-project conditions, the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario water levels were more predicable and controllable, and the range of water levels was compressed (i.e. extreme highs lower, extreme lows higher). Despite the flaws and mistakes, it is important to recognize that, in the end the remaking of the river largely functioned as planned.
[i] IJC, Canadian Section, docket 67-2-5:6: Lake Ontario Levels Reference, Meetings, McNaughton, Burbridge, Cote 1953/01/16, Memorandum to General McNaughton re August 29, 1952 meeting, September 2, 1952. A number of claims were made by U.S. Lake Ontario shore owners because of Gut dam. They unsuccessfully tried to sue Canada, and requested that the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission examine the claims. Finally, in 1968, Canada agreed to pay a token $350,000 as settlement for the alleged damage. Carl F. Goodman, “Canada-United States Settlement of Gut Dam Claims: Report of the Agent of the United States Before the Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal,” International Legal Materials, Vol. 8 No. 1 (January 1969), 118-143.
[ii] Government of Canada, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 25, vol. 6352, file 1268-AD-40, pt 1, St. Lawrence Project: Dredging at Cornwall Island (Dec 1, 1954 to March 25, 1955), Memorandum for the Minister – St. Lawrence Project, January 24, 1955.
[iii] The long term average flow (1860-1954) was determined to be 240,000 cfs, which was about 4,000 cfs more than the average used for Method of Regulation No. 5. IJC, Canadian Section, docket 68-5-1: St. Lawrence Project, Miscellaneous Memoranda, March 1954 – Memorandum. Studies showed that the impact of the levels of Gut Dam had been exaggerated and was really about 4 ½ inches, which was approximately half of what had been believed by some. IJC, Canadian Section, 68-2-5:6-1: St. Lawrence Power Application, Minutes of IJC Meetings. 1952/07 & 1962/04, St. Lawrence Power Application: modification of Order of Approval (Executive Session, Boston), April 9, 1954; “Effects on Lake Ontario Water Levels of the Gut Dam and Channel Changes in the Galop Rapids Reach of the St. Lawrence River, Main Report,” Report to the International Joint Commission by the International Lake Ontario Board of Engineers, October 1958.
[iv] IJC, Canadian Section, 68-3-V2: St. Lawrence Power Application, Correspondence From 1954/01/01 to 1954/12/21, Henry to McNaughton, Re: 238-242 Controlled Single Stage Project, International Rapids Section, May 12, 1954.
[v] IJC, Canadian Section, 68-3-V2: St. Lawrence Power Application, Correspondence from 1954/01/01 to 1954/12/21, Memorandum of Meeting, July 3, 1954.
[vi] There is a large body of literature on scientific uncertainty and policy-making in general, much of it concerning the Great Lakes environment, such as Terence Kehoe, Cleaning Up the Great Lakes: From Cooperation to Confrontation (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), Chapter 5: The Burden of Proof: Pollution Control and Scientific Uncertainty; Stephen Bocking, Nature’s Experts: Science, Politics, and the Environment (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004); Dean Bavington; Managed Annihilation: An Unnatural History of the Newfoundland Cod Collapse (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
[vii] The regulation criteria outlined that the water level of Montreal Harbour would be no lower than would have occurred if the power project had not been built. J.B. Bryce, A Hydraulic Engineering History of the St. Lawrence Project with Special Reference to Regulation of Waters Levels and Flows (Toronto: Ontario Hydro, 1982), 94; LAC, RG 25, vol. 6778, file 1268-D-40, pt 43.2, St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project – General File, DEA Memorandum: Lake Ontario levels, April 26, 1955.
[viii] IJC, Canadian Section, docket 68-2-5:1-9– St. Lawrence Power Application. Executive Session 1957/04 & 1957/10, IJC, St. Lawrence Power Development, Semi-Annual Meeting (Washington), April 9, 1957.
[ix] IJC, Canadian Section, St. Lawrence Power Applic. Model Studies – Vol. I, The Importance to Canada of the Construction of a Hydraulic Model for the Determination of the effects of the Gut Dam and Channel Improvements in the Galops Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River (McNaughton), December 9, 1953.
[x] IJC Canadian Section, docket 68-8-6:3. St. Lawrence Power Application. FPC in the United States Court of Appeals 1953-1954, St. Lawrence Power Appl., Model Studies – Vol. I, Associate Committee of the National Research Council on St. Lawrence River Models (draft), October 15, 1953
[xi] LAC, RG 25, vol. 6778, file 1268-D-40, pt 45, St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project – General File, DEA Memorandum: St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project: Visit to Ontario Hydro models, July 5, 1955.
[xii] IJC, Canadian Section, Assoc. Committee on St. Lawrence River Model Studies, Progress Memorandum No. 2. National Research Council, January 15, 1958.
[xiv] Tina Loo and Meg Stanley make this point in the context of British Columbia dam-building in the
1960s and 1970s, calling it “high modernist local knowledge”: Tina Loo with Meg Stanley, “An Environmental History of Progress: Damming the Peace and Columbia Rivers,” Canadian Historical Review, 92, 3 (September 2011), 399-427. Matthew Evenden also provides an excellent discussion of the expertise and authority of fisheries scientists in the context of 1950s British Columbia dam-building: Matthew Evenden, Fish versus Power: An Environmental History of the Fraser River (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
[xv] According to Passfield, the SLSA alone employed 120 Canadian engineers, while Ontario Hydro used 66 engineers in design, and 50 more to supervise construction of the powerhouse. Robert W. Passfield, “The Construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway,” Canal History and Technology Proceedings, XXII (2003), 41. On the use of gauges, Bryce, 75-81.
[xvi] Loo with Stanley, “An Environmental History of Progress: Damming the Peace and Columbia Rivers”; Joy Parr, Sensing Changes: Technologies, Environments, and the Everyday, 1953-2003 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009).
[xvii] IJC, Canadian Section, docket 68-2-5: Joint Board of Engineers, vol. 1, Meeting No. 28 of St. Lawrence River Joint Board of Engineers, July 3, 1958.
[xviii] In 2012, the IJC announced a new method of regulation, Bv7, that allows for more natural fluctuation cycles and greater variability. This has since been modified to Plan 2014.
[xix] Six ice booms were subsequently installed to prevent such ice formations. IJC, Canadian Section, docket 68-3-V10. St. Lawrence Power Application. Correspondence Re: Interim Measures Regulation, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Re St. Lawrence, January 14, 1959; IJC, Canadian Section, docket 68-8-2:2. St. Lawrence Power Application, SLRJBE – Basic Documents, Brief to the St. Lawrence River Joint Board of Engineers on Ice-Boom Installation for St. Lawrence Power Project, June 10, 1959.
[xx] LAC, RG 25, vol. 5026, file 1268-D-40, pt. 54, St. Lawrence Seaway Project – General File, Jan 8, 1960 to Feb 27, 1962, Memorandum: Power Generation at Barnhart Island, October 13, 1961.
[xxi] Method of regulation 1958-DD, which incorporates 1958-D, was eventually developed to deal with such fluctuating conditions.
[xxii] Bryce, 108.
Posted by danielmacfarlane on June 27, 2013
I’m close to being finished with my book on the history of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project (i.e. waiting for the copy-edit, finalizing image permissions, indexing soon). I’ve been using the following as a working title (in fact, the main part of the title was what I had used for my doctoral dissertation): To the Heart of the Continent: Creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project.
However, the press informed me that they think I should change it: “to the heart of the continent” will make people think of Africa. Plus the subtitle doesn’t make U.S. involvement clear, which doesn’t help with marketing there, and the title and subtitle were just plain long (another suggestion was to get ride of “power project” – which would be pithier, but not as accurate).
Fair enough. So it’s time to brainstorm some new ideas. I don’t really want to call it an “environmental” or “transnational” or “environmental diplomacy” history right in the title, since I don’t feel like that would be an accurate reflection of the range of different fields that I’m trying to address.
Here is some of what I came up with (and feedback is more than welcome!). I could go with the TITLE: SUBTITLE format, as this allows one to convey a lot of information; or just a title with no subtitle, which has a simple elegance.
Possible Single Titles:
“The Creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway [and Power Project]“
“Canada, the United States, and the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project.”
“The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project”
Possible Title-Subtitle combinations
“Watershed Decisions: SUBTITLE”
“Watershed Moments: SUBTITLE”
“Ripple Effects: SUBTITLE”
“Rapid Changes: SUBTITLE”
“Modern River: SUBTITLE”
“Engineered River: SUBTITLE”
“Fluid Border: SUBTITLE”
“Fluid Relations: SUBTITLE”
TITLE: The Canada-U.S. Creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway [and Power Project]
TITLE: A Canada-U.S. Megaproject
TITLE: Canada, the United States, and the St. Lawrence Seaway [and Power Project]
Posted by danielmacfarlane on June 26, 2013